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ABSTRACT
The mathematical problem of determining a gambler’s risk of ruin involves analyzing de-
cisions of only one agent, namely the “gambler”. In this work we consider an extension that
introduces two additional players, so called “sellers”. These two new agents can boost the
probability of success for the gambler by selling to him (using a jargon borrowed from the
theory of excited random walks) a “cookie” which is used to increase the probability of moving
forward in the next step. The generalized gambler’s ruin scenario considers an excited random
walk on a finite interval of integer line with two “cookie store” locations and unlimited supply
of cookies at each. Each time when the buyer (walker) visits a store location, he has an oppor-
tunity to decide whether he is willing to consume the cookie or not. We wish to determine the
equilibrium prices and cookie store locations in a formal game associated with this generalized
gambler’s ruin scenario.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General background and previous work
Excited random walks (ERW) or random walks in a cookie environment on Zd is a modifica-
tion of the nearest neighbor simple random walk such that in several first visits to each site of
the integer lattice, the walk’s jump kernel gives a preference to a certain direction and assigns
equal probabilities to the remaining (2d− 1) directions. If the current location of the random
walk has been already visited more than a certain number of times, then the walk moves to
one of its nearest neighbors with equal probabilities. The model was introduced by Benjamini
and Wilson in [3] and extended by Zerner in [13]. In the “cookies” jargon, upon first several
visits to every site of the lattice, the walker consumes a cookie providing them a boost toward
a distinguished direction in the next step. Many important aspects of the asymptotic behavior
of excited random walks on Z are by now well-understood [11]. An application of the theory
of excited random walks to the physics of DNA molecular motors is discussed in [1, 4].
This work continues to investigate a class of models introduced in [10]. In [10] several
variations of a two-person (Stackelberg) game between a “buyer” and a “seller”, whose major
component is a random walk of the buyer on a finite interval of integers were considered. The
key element of the game is a gambler’s ruin problem [6, 7], where in contrast to the classical
version, the walker (buyer) has the option of consuming “cookies”, which when used, increase
the probability of moving in the desired direction for the next step. The cookies are supplied to
the buyer by the second player (seller). The ultimate goal is to determine an equilibrium price
policy for the seller and the equilibrium “cookie store” location. The optimization problem
which the seller faces is somewhat similar to that of a monopoly whose market is a spatially
non-homogeneous Hotelling beach with demand curve varying randomly across the population
2[8, 9]. The original Hotelling beach (linear city) model was introduced to illustrate Hotelling’s
law in economics, namely a general paradigm that in many markets it is rational for producers
to make their products as similar as possible.
1.2 Motivation and goals
The game can serve as a simplified model to explore the relationship between economic
agents in a risky environment, for instance a firm in an innovative and competitive segment
of a hi-tech industry and an experienced consulting company. The firm (buyer) seeks to re-
duce uncertainty and increase the expected profit by investing in the consulting service at a
“bottleneck” point of its production line, while the consultant (seller) wants to optimize the
configuration and the price of its service package.
From the probability theory point of view, the models introduced in [10] and in this work
attempt
1. To measure the gain of the walker from exploiting a reinforcing mechanism represented by
“cookies”. It is natural to study this type of problems using a gambler’s ruin scenario and
within a game-theoretic framework, where exact features of the reinforcing mechanism
are determined through the interaction between the walker and sellers. This is in contrast
to the usual excited random walk, where the walker, as a price-taker in a large market,
has no effect on determining the parameters of the cookie environment.
2. To further contribute to the basic understanding of one-dimensional excited random walks
by considering a suitable variation of gambler’s ruin problem. It is well-known, see for
instance [11], that the asymptotic behavior of a random walk can be inferred from the
solution to the corresponding gambler’s ruin problem. In particular, the asymptotic
behavior of excited random walk is largely governed by a single parameter, its average
local drift. Curiously, the main result of this work suggests that the same parameter solely
determines the optimal cookie prices for a fixed store location (see Chapter 2 below).
3. The optimization methods employed in this work are, up to a certain point, methods of
continuous convex optimization. One could expect that, similarly to the Hotelling linear
3city model, the equilibrium configuration will place the cookie stores at the same location.
However, it is easy to see that this solution is not available when the cookie’s prices can
vary and are determined by the sellers. Thus the actual equilibrium design is expected
to be affected by a not-so-intrinsic to the problem discrete optimization. A part of our
initial motivation was to see whether the discrete design can force the risk-neutral buyer
to become effectively risk-adverse. Remarkably, in some particular sense the answer to
this question turns out to be affirmative (see the discussion of the main result in Chapter
3). We are planning to consider in the future an extension of this work to a continuous
time model based on the “excited stochastic process” considered in [12].
1.3 Overview of the model
This thesis introduces a generalization of the model of [10] to a three-person game with
two competing sellers and a buyer. The model is significantly more involved from the technical
point of view and computationally extensive because of the required rather detailed analysis
of the underlying finite-state Markov chain. More specifically, in this work we introduce the
following modification of the classical two-person gambler’s ruin scenario, where the buyer has
the option to consume cookies supplied by the sellers at two different cookie locations. The
cookie serves to instantly increase the probability of moving forward in the next step. Set the
starting point of buyer as n ∈ N located between 0 and b ∈ N, b ≥ 2, and treat the direction
from 0 to b as the forward direction. Assume that the buyer performs a nearest-neighbor
random walk on the integer line with absorbtion at 0 and b. If the buyer reaches the point b
before 0 he is rewarded with R dollars, otherwise he receives a zero payoff. Simultaneously and
independently each of other, two sellers set up the “cookie” stores at integer sites n1 and n2
within the interval (0, b). The two sellers sell the cookies at fixed prices c1 and c2, respectively.
At a regular site, the buyer moves one step forward with a fixed probability p ∈ (0, 1), and
backward with a fixed probability q = 1−p. If he consumes a cookie at the store locations, then
he moves one step forward with a larger probability p+ 1 ∈ (p, 1) from n1 and p+ 2 ∈ (p, 1)
from n2. The buyer can choose either accept the cookie for the suggested price or reject it in
order to reach the ultimate purpose, which is maximizing the total revenue at the absorbtion
4time. The goal of this work is to determine an equilibrium price for each cookie and location
for the “cookie” store.
In this work, we are focus on the a special situation, similar to the one-seller counterpart
which is referred to in [10] as a basic game, that is we assume p = q = 12 . We use the Markov
property of the underlying excited random walk and a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to solve
the relationship between the price and location. In Section 2 we treat the location of “cookie”
stores as a fixed variable to find out the equilibrium price, while the contrary situation will be
considered in the Section 3 where the equilibrium store locations are determined. We assume
that the buyer is risk-neutral and maximizes its expected game payoff. The proof of the main
result is concluded in the last section.
1.4 Game description
In this and next sections, we discuss the basic game. We consider the following scenario with
a fixed probability p = q = 12 . First fix any b ∈ N, b ≥ 2, and set the forward direction as from
0 to b. Then let the buyer starting the random walk at a fixed point n ∈ N located between 0
and b. On the other hand, the two sellers, who are seeking for the maximum expected revenue,
need to make a decision for the store’s location n1 and n2 and the price of each cookie c1 and
c2 independently. In this scenario, there is no product cost for both of the two sellers and the
number of cookies η that the sellers provided to the buyer can be infinite many. The buyer can
accept the cookie as a instant probability boost strategy, however, he has an option to refuse if
he consider it is not worthwhile. Denote 1 ∈ (0, 16) and 2 ∈ (0, 16) as the cookie strategy for the
two sellers separately. If the buyer decides to accept the cookie at the first/second cookie store
(located at n1/n2) he moves forward on Z according to Pn1 = p+ 1/Pn2 = p+ 2,otherwise his
motion is based on P = p. Notice that, the buyer can only moves step by step. Once the buyer
arrives any of the sides, the game is end. If the buyer reaches the point b first he is rewarded
with R dollars, in contrast, he gets nothing. Consider the money he paid for cookies as the
cost, the buyer seeks to maximize his expected earnings.
The main purpose of this section is to calculate the explicit result for the value of optimal
price for each cookie.
5Definition 2.1 Game Γn
• Γn is a three-person game based on the Stackelberg model (the first two players take
action independently, the third player observes their action and then decides his own
moves). All of the players in the game need to consider a strategy that maximizes their
corresponding expected payoff given the chosen strategy pf two other players..
• The first two players are the sellers, and the third player is the buyer. The two sellers
move first and inform their action to the buyer separately. Then the buyer determines
his game plan and starts a random walk.
• Let S := [0,∞) × {1, ..., b − 1} be the set of strategies of the two sellers. Each pair
(c1, n1) ∈ S specifies the cookie’s price c1 > 0 and the store’s location n1 ∈ {1, ..., b− 1}
determined by the first seller. Similarly, each pair (c2, n2) ∈ S specifies the cookie’s price
c2 > 0 and the store’s location n2 ∈ {1, ..., b− 1} determined by the second seller. Notice
that, we default n1 ≤ n2 in the whole set.
• Let B := S2 → {en1 , en2} where ek = {0, 1} be the strategy of the buyer. The buyer
can choose to reject the cookie or consume it at the two different stores with the certain
price.
Definition 2.2 The buyer’s random walk
• Let Xk ∈ (0, b) denote buyer’s location on the integer line at time k ∈ Z+.
• Let Mk ∈ Z+ be the number of cookies available at the walk’s current location at time
k ∈ Z+.
• Since the buyer can only move one step at a time, the Markov chain transition kernel of
buyer’s random walk at the “cookie” store n1 is given by
Pn1(Xk+1 = i+ 1,mk+1 = m− 1|Xk = i,Mk = m) = p+ 1i=n1,m>0 · 
Pn1(Xk+1 = i− 1,mk+1 = m− 1|Xk = i,Mk = m) = q − 1i=n1,m>0 · 
6• Similarly, the Markov chain transition kernel of buyer’s random walk at the “cookie”
store n2 is given by
Pn2(Xk+1 = i+ 1,mk+1 = m− 1|Xk = i,Mk = m) = p+ 1i=n2,m>0 · 
Pn2(Xk+1 = i− 1,mk+1 = m− 1|Xk = i,Mk = m) = q − 1i=n2,m>0 · 
where 1A is the indicator.
7CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL PRICES c∗1 AND c
∗
2 FOR A GIVEN STORE
LOCATIONS
The goal of this section is to determine optimal prices.
If the price of each cookie is attractive enough, the buyer will choose to consume it. Indeed, if
the cookies are free, the buyer will definitely want them, and the claim follows by the continuity.
Therefore, the buyer would consume the cookies at both of the two sellers when the price is
optimal (does the optimal exist?).
For n ∈ I, we denote by Rn the expected reward of the buyer who starts their random walk
at the location n ∈ I. By the strong Markov property,
Rn1 = −c1 + (q − ε1)αRn1 + (p+ ε1)βRn1 + (p+ ε1)(1− β)Rn2 ,
where α := Pn1−1(Tn1 < T0) is the probability that the buyer returns to n1 from the backward
direction and β := Pn1+1(Tn1 < Tn2) is the probability that the buyer returns to n1 from the
forward direction.
Similarly,
Rn2 = −c2 + (q − ε2)γRn2 + (q − ε2)(1− γ)Rn1
+ (p+ ε)δRn2 + (p+ ε)(1− δ)R,
where γ := Pn2−1(Tn2 < T0) is the probability that the buyer returns to n2 from the backward
direction and δ := Pn2+1(Tn2 < Tb) is the probability that the buyer returns to n2 from the
forward direction.
The solution to the classical gambler’s ruin problem [6] yields:
α =
n1 − 1
n1
, β =
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1
γ =
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 , δ =
b− n2 − 1
b− n2
8Therefore,
Rn1 =
(p+ 1)(1− β)Rn2 − c1
1− (q − 1)α− (p+ 1)β (2.1)
Rn2 =
[(q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1)]
(q − 1)(q − 2)(b− n2) + (q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1R
− (q − 2)(b− n2)n1
(q − 1)(q − 2)(b− n2) + (q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1 c1
− [(q − 1)(n2 − n1)(b− n2) + (p+ 1)(b− n2)n1]
(q − 1)(q − 2)(b− n2) + (q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1 c2
Definition 2.3 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium[8]
• A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium means that the strategy serves best for each player
and it satisfied that every player is playing in a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
Since both of the two sellers seek for the maximum profit simultaneously, the optimal c∗1
and c∗2 have to satisfied the following conditions. Without loss of generality, when the first
seller fix the price of each cookie at c∗1, the second seller would not change the price c∗2 for a
bigger benefit.
Therefore,if we fixed n1 and n2, then the revenue Rn1 and Rn2 should be larger if the
buyer consumes at both of the two cookie stores. This condition is equivalent to imposing the
following set of four inequalities.
Rn1(1, c1, 2, c2) > Rn1(0, 0, 2, c2) (2.2)
Rn1(1, c1, 2, c2) > Rn1(1, c1, 0, 0) (2.3)
Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) > Rn2(0, 0, 2, c2) (2.4)
Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) > Rn2(1, c1, 0, 0) (2.5)
For convenient, we first rewrite Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) and Rn2(0, 0, 2, c2) in (2.4) as
Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) =
X1R−X2c1 −X3c2
K1
Rn2(0, 0, 2, c2) =
X11R−X13c2
K11
9with
X1 = (q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1 (2.6)
X2 = (q − 2)(b− n2)n1 (2.7)
X3 = (q − 1)(n2 − n1)(b− n2) + (p+ 1)(b− n2)n1 (2.8)
X11 = q(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 2)n1 (2.9)
X13 = q(n2 − n1)(b− n2) + p(b− n2)n1 (2.10)
K1 = (q − 1)(q − 2)(b− n2) + (q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) (2.11)
+ (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1 (2.12)
> 0 (2.13)
K11 = q(q − 2)(b− n2) + q(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 2)n1 (2.14)
> 0 (2.15)
Then (2.4) can be write as
(X1R−X2c1 −X3c2)K11 − (X11R−X13c2)K1 > 0
⇒ (X1K11 −X11K1)R−X2K11c1 − (X3K11 −X13K1)c2 > 0
where
X1K
1
1 −X11K1 = (q − 2)(b− n2)n1 · (p+ 2)1
X2K
1
1 = (q − 2)(b− n2)n1 · [q(q − 2)(b− n2) + q(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 2)n1]
X3K
1
1 −X13K1 = (q − 2)(b− n2)n1 · (b− n2)1
By algebraic simplification, we get following result:
(p+ 2)1R− [q(q − 2)(b− n2) + q(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 2)n1]c1 > (b− n2)1c2
We then use the method to deal with (2.5), let
Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) =
X1R−X2c1 −X3c2
K1
Rn2(1, c1, 0, 0) =
X21R−X22c1
K21
10
with
X21 = p(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 1)n1 (2.16)
X22 = q(b− n2)n1 (2.17)
K21 = q(q − 1)(b− n2) + p(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 1)n1 (2.18)
> 0 (2.19)
and X1, X2, X3,K1 has been defined in (2.6),(2.7),(2.8)and(2.11).
Hence,(2.5) is
(X1R−X2c1 −X3c2)K21 − (X21R−X22c1)K1 > 0
⇒ (X1K21 −X21K1)R− (X2K21 −X21K1)c1 −X3K21c2 > 0
where
X1K
2
1 −X21K1 = [(q − 1)(n2 − n1 + (p+ 1)n1](b− n2) · (q − 1)2
X2K
2
1 −X21K1 = −[(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)n1](b− n2) · n12
X3K
2
1 = [(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)n1](b− n2)
·[q(q − 1)(b− n2) + p(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 1)n1]
Therefore,
(q − 1)2R+ n12c1 > [q(q − 1)(b− n2) + p(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 1)n1]c2
After solving the last two inequalities (2.4) and (2.5), we need figure out their the relationship
with the first two (2.2) and (2.3).
Plug the value of Rn1 defined in (2.1) into (2.2), we have
(p+ 1)(1− β)Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2)− c1
1− (q − 1)α− (p+ 1)β >
p(1− β)Rn2(0, 0, 2, c2)
1− qα− pβ
⇒ (p+ 1)n1Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2)− (n2 − n1)n1c1
(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)n1 >
pn1
q(n2 − n1) + pn1Rn2(0, 0, 2, c2)
⇒ Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) > Rn2(0, 0, 2, c2)
Similarly, for (2.3),
(p+ 1)(1− β)Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2)− c1
1− (q − 1)α− (p+ 1)β >
(p+ 1)(1− β)Rn2(1, c1, 0, 0)− c1
1− (q − 1)α− (p+ 1)β
⇒ Rn2(1, c1, 2, c2) > Rn2(1, c1, 0, 0)
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Therefore, the inspection of (2.1) shows that in fact the first two inequalities imply the last
two in the above system. By using the closed form expressions for R1 and R2 the system is
reduced to the following set of four inequalities.
l1 :c1 > 0
l2 :c2 > 0
l3 :A1 ·R+B1 · c1 > D1 · c2
l4 :A2 ·R+B2 · c1 > D2 · c2
with
A1 = (p+ 2)1 (2.20)
A2 = (q − 1)2 (2.21)
B1 = −[q(q − 2)(b− n2) + q(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 2)n1] (2.22)
B2 = n12 (2.23)
D1 = (b− n2)1 (2.24)
D2 = q(q − 1)(b− n2) + p(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + p(p+ 1)n1 (2.25)
The set of solutions in the (c1, c2)-plane is non-empty and bounded by two (in general, oblique)
straight straight and two axes. The intersection point of two slanting lines is N(cN1, cN2),
where
cN1 =
A2D1 −A1D2
B1D2 −B2D1R and cN2 =
A2B1 −A1B2
B1D2 −B2D1R
Since we are focusing on the p = q = 12 , then we can compute out the value of cN1 and cN2.
cN1 =
1
2(
1
2 − 2)(12 − 1)1b+ (12 − 1)12n2 + (12 + 2)21n1
(12(
1
2 − 2)b+ 2n2)(12(12 − 1)b+ 1n1) + 12(b− n2)n1
R (2.26)
=
21R
b
(2.27)
cN2 =
1
2(
1
2 − 1)(12 − 2)2b+ (12 − 1)22n2 + (12 + 2)12n1
(12(
1
2 − 2)b+ 2n2)(12(12 − 1)b+ 1n1) + 12(b− n2)n1
R (2.28)
=
22R
b
(2.29)
For a graphical illustration we refer to Fig. 2 below. Note that for any fixed c2 < cN2 there is
a constant c1 < cl1 such that the value of Rn1 at c1 is bigger then at cl1 (see Fig. 2). Similarly,
12
for an arbitrary c1 one can find c
′
2 < cN2 such that the value of Rn2 at c
′
2 is bigger then at c2.
Hence, neither of two sellers would benefit form changing the price unilaterally if and only if
c∗1 = cN1 and c∗2 = cN2.
Figure 2.1 The relationship between c1 and c2.
As illustrated in the figure, the plot can be classified into four areas by the straight lines
l3 and l4. Furthermore, the shadows D in the plot represents the price that the buyer would
accept. Otherwise, the buyer would reject the cookies at least one of the two stores. Let point
M be the projection of point N on c1−axis. If the pair of price (c1, c2) lies on l3, then the first
seller can always increase c1 and push the price point into area D. And once (c1, c2) appears
in D, the second seller will definitely choose to rise his price, which leads two results. If the
price point is on the right of NM , then the action would force the point to l4 line. Otherwise,
the two sellers would reach the agreement of price on point N . On the other hand, if the price
point is on l4, increasing the price is reasonable only for the second seller. Finally, turns out
that the only price point satisfied Nash equilibrium for the two sellers is point N = (c∗1, c∗2).
Since Rn1 can be treated as a function of Rn2 , then the only thing left in this system is that
we need to check if
Rn2(1, c
∗
1, 2, c
∗
2) > Rn2(0, 0, 0, 0)
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Proof Since c∗1 and c∗2 satisfied the inequality (2.5), then we know that
Rn2(1, c
∗
1, 2, c
∗
2) > Rn2(1, c∗1, 0, 0)
The only thing left that need to be proved is
Rn2(1, c
∗
1, 0, 0) > Rn2(0, 0, 0, 0)
Plug the value of c∗1 into (2.1), we get
Rn2(1, c
∗
1, 0, 0) =
(12 − 1)b+ 21n1
(12 − 1)b− 21n1
n2R
b
= (1 +
41n1
(12 − 1)b− 21n1
)
n2R
b
> (1 + 41n1
(12 − 31)b
)
n2R
b
> n2R
b
= Rn2(0, 0, 0, 0)
Therefore, Rn2(1, c
∗
1, 2, c
∗
2) > Rn2(0, 0, 0, 0).
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CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL STORE LOCATIONS n∗1 AND n
∗
2
In this section we continue to investigate the game-theoretic framework introduced some-
where before. The main purpose of this section is to explicitly identify the optimal location for
each cookie store.
In the last section we have figured out the optimal prices c∗1 and c∗2 as a function of the
two store locations. This will be used here to determine the optimal store location n∗1 and n∗2
for the two sellers according to the optimal price. We denote by Wn1 the revenue of the seller
(located at n1) if the buyer starts at n1 (that is, n = n1), and by Wn2 the revenue of the seller
(located at n2) if the buyer starts at n2 (that is, n = n2). Then we can write,
Wn1 = η
n1
n1 · c1 and Wn2 = ηn2n2 · c2,
where ηxy stands for the number of visits of the buyer to the store located at x when he starts
at y. If the buyer starts at n1, then the strong Markov property implies
ηn1n1 = 1 + (q − 1)
n1 − 1
n1
ηn1n1 + (p+ 1)
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 η
n1
n1 + (p+ 1)
1
n2 − n1 η
n2
n1
ηn2n1 = (q − 2)
1
n2 − n1 η
n1
n1 + (p+ 2)
b− n2 − 1
b− n2 η
n2
n1 + (q − 2)
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 η
n2
n1
Thus we get
ηn2n1 =
(1− (q − 1)n1−1n1 − (p+ 1)n2−n1−1n2−n1 ) · ηn1n1 − 1
p+1
n2−n1
We then substitute ηn2n1 into this equation:
(1− (q − 2)n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 − (p+ 2)
b− n2 − 1
b− n2 ) · η
n2
n1 =
q − 2
n2 − n1 · η
n1
n1
And thus,
ηn1n1 =
(p+ 2)(n2 − n1)n1 + (q − 2)(b− n2)n1
(q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (q − 1)(q − 2)(b− n2) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1
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Similarly, if the buyer starts at n2,
ηn2n2 = 1 + (q − 2)
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 η
n2
n2 + (p+ 2)
b− n2 − 1
b− n2 η
n2
n2 + (q − 2)
1
n2 − n1 η
n1
n2
ηn1n2 = (q − 1)
n1 − 1
n1
ηn1n2 + (p+ 1)
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 η
n1
n2 + (p+ 1)
1
n2 − n1 η
n2
n2
Then, we have
ηn1n2 =
(1− (q − 2)n2−n1−1n2−n1 − (p+ 2) b−n2−1b−n2 ) · ηn2n2 − 1
q−2
n2−n1
Substituted into the equation:
(1− (q − 1)n1 − 1
n1
− (p+ 1)n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 ) · η
n1
n2 =
p+ 1
n2 − n1 · η
n2
n2
Thus,
ηn2n2 =
(p+ 1)(b− n2)n1 + (q − 1)(n2 − n1)(b− n2)
(q − 1)(p+ 2)(n2 − n1) + (q − 1)(q − 2)(b− n2) + (p+ 1)(p+ 2)n1
Considering this problem in the reality situation, we have the following cases:
Case 1: When the buyer starts at n, where n1 = n < n2
When the buyer starts at n = n1, we first define W
1
n1 as the actual benefit of the first
seller(located at n1) and W
1
n2 as the actual benefit of the second seller(located at n2). Then
we can write:
W 1n1 = Wn1 = η
n1
n1c
∗
1
W 1n2 = η
n2
n1c
∗
2
Hence,
W 1n1 =
(12 + 2)(n2 − n1)n1 + (12 − 2)(b− n2)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×21R
b
W 1n2 =
(12 − 2)(b− n2)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
16
Case 2: When the buyer starts at n, where n1 < n2 = n
When the buyer starts at n = n2, we first define W
2
n1 as the actual benefit of the first
seller(located at n1) and W
2
n2 as the actual benefit of the second seller(located at n2). Therefore
we can write:
W 2n1 = Wn1 = η
n1
n2c
∗
1
W 2n2 = η
n2
n2c
∗
2
We can get the value of ηn1n2 and η
n2
n2 directly from the above analysis. Therefore,
W 2n1 =
(12 + 1)(b− n2)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×21R
b
W 2n2 =
(12 + 1)(b− n2)n1 + (12 − 1)(b− n2)(n2 − n1)
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
Case 3: When the buyer starts at n, where n1 < n < n2
When the buyer starts at n, we first define W 3n1 as the actual benefit of the first seller(located
at n1) and W
3
n2 as the actual benefit of the second seller(located at n2). Therefore we can
write:
W 3n1 = αnWn1 + (1− αn)βWn1
where αn is the probability that the buyer starts at n and reaches to n1 before n2, and β is the
probability that that the buyer starts from n2 and gets to n1 before b.
W 3n2 = (1− αn)Wn2 + αn(1− γ)Wn2
where γ is the probability that that the buyer starts from n1 and gets to 0 before n2. Based
17
on the property of Markov chain, we know that:
αn =
n2 − n
n2 − n1
β = (p+ 2)
b− n2 − 1
b− n2 β + (q − 2)
1
n2 − n1 + (q − 2)
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 β
⇒ β = (q − 2)(b− n2)
(q − 2)(b− n2) + (p+ 2)(n2 − n1)
γ = (q − 1) 1
n1
+ (q − 1)n1 − 1
n1
γ + (p+ 1)
n2 − n1 − 1
n2 − n1 γ
1− γ = (p+ 1)n1
(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)n1
Therefore,
W 3n1 =
(12 − 2)(b− n2)n1 + (12 + 2)(n2 − n)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×21R
b
W 3n2 =
(12 − 1)(n− n1)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(b− n2)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
In order to figure out the relationship between W 3n1 and n1, we assume n2 is fixed , then
W 3n1 =
(12 − 2)(b− n2)n1 + (12 + 2)(n2 − n)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×21R
b
=
(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 2)(n2 − n)
( 1
2
−1)( 12+2)n2+( 12−1)( 12−2)(b−n2)
n1
+ (12 + 1)(
1
2 + 2)
21R
b
Therefore, W 3n1 is monotonic increasing as n1 < n increased. The trend of W
3
n1 is logically force
the n1 goes to n as close as possible, which force the case 3 into the case 2.
Similarly, if we fixed n1 and focus on W
3
n2 and n2, then
W 3n2 =
(12 − 1)(n− n1)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(b− n2)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
=
(12 − 1)(n− n1) + (12 + 1)n1
( 1
2
−1)( 12+2)(n2−n1)+( 12+1)( 12+2)n1
b−n2 + (
1
2 − 1)(12 − 2)
22R
b
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Then for the part
Z =
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
b− n2
we can rewrite it as
Z =
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)n2 + 21(12 + 2)n1
b− n2
= −(1
2
− 1)(1
2
+ 2) +
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)b+ 21(12 + 2)n1
−n2 + b
It it obviously that Z is decreasing as n2 decreased, so that W
3
n2 is monotone increasing as n2
decreased. Then to make W 3n2 reaches a higher benefit, we want to push n2 to n as close as
possible, which actually turns case 3 into the case 1.
Case 4: When the buyer starts at n, where n1 < n2 < n
When the buyer starts at n, we first define W 4n1 as the actual benefit of the first seller(located
at n1) and W
4
n2 as the actual benefit of the second seller(located at n2). Therefore we can
write:
W 4n1 = αnβWn1
where αn is the probability that the buyer starts at n and reaches to n2 before b, and β is the
probability that that the buyer starts from n2 and gets to n1 before b.
W 4n2 = αnWn2
Here, we have
αn =
b− n
b− n2 and β =
(q − 2)(b− n2)
(q − 2)(b− n2) + (p+ 2)(n2 − n1)
Thus,
W 4n1 =
(12 − 2)(b− n)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×21R
b
W 4n2 =
(12 − 1)(n2 − n1)(b− n) + (12 + 1)(b− n)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
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Since n1 < n2 < n, we can focus on the relationship between W
4
n2 and n2. Fixed n1, we have,
W 4n2 =
(12 − 1)(n2 − n1)(b− n) + (12 + 1)(b− n)n1
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
=
(12 − 1)n2 + 21n1
2(12 − 1)2n2 + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)b+ 21(12 + 2)n1
22(b− n)R
b
=
( 1
22
+
Z
2(12 − 1)2n2 + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)b+ 21(12 + 2)n1
)22(b− n)R
b
where
Z = − 1
22
(
(
1
2
− 1)(1
2
− 2)b+ 21(1
2
+ 2)n1
)
+ 21n1 < 0
This indicates that W 4n2 is monotone increasing as n2 increased. In order to maximize the
earning of the second seller, we will require n2 goes to n, which turns case 4 into case 2
Case 5: When the buyer starts at n, where n < n1 < n2
When the buyer starts at n, we first define W 5n1 as the actual benefit of the first seller(located
at n1) and W
5
n2 as the actual benefit of the second seller(located at n2). Therefore we can
write:
W 5n1 = αnWn1
where αn is the probability that the buyer starts at n and reaches to n1 before 0.
W 5n2 = αn(1− γ)Wn2
where γ is the probability that that the buyer starts from n1 and gets to 0 before n2. As what
we discussed before,
αn =
n
n1
and 1− γ = (p+ 1)n1
(q − 1)(n2 − n1) + (p+ 1)n1
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Thus,
W 5n1 =
(12 − 2)(b− n2)n+ (12 + 2)(n2 − n1)n
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×21R
b
W 5n2 =
(12 + 1)(b− n2)n
(12 − 1)(12 + 2)(n2 − n1) + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)(b− n2) + (12 + 1)(12 + 2)n1
×22R
b
Since n < n1 < n2, the only thing left is the relationship between W
5
n1 and n1. We then fixed
n2,
W 5n1 =
−(12 + 2)n1 + (12 − 2)b+ 22n2
2(12 − 1)2n2 + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)b+ 21(12 + 2)n1
21nR
b
=
(
− 1
21
+
Z
2(12 − 1)2n2 + (12 − 1)(12 − 2)b+ 21(12 + 2)n1
)21nR
b
where
Z = −(− 1
21
)(2(
1
2
− 1)2n2 + (1
2
− 1)(1
2
− 2)b) + (1
2
− 2)b+ 22n2 > 0
Therefore, W 5n1 is monotone increasing as n1 decreased. In order to maximize the earning of
the first seller, we will require n1 goes to n., which turns case 5 into case 1
In conclude, case 1 and case 2 are the best choice for the above 5 different cases. And we still
need to consider a following special case.
Special Case: When the buyer starts at n, where n1 = n2 = n
Under this situation, both of the two stores coincide with the starting point,n1 = n2 = n.
Therefore the number of visits to the two stores should be same, write as ηnn. Meanwhile,
define W 6n1 as the actual benefit of the first seller(located at n1) and W
6
n2 as the actual benefit
of the second seller(located at n2).
ηnn = 1 + (q − ∗)
n− 1
n
ηnn + (p+ 
∗)
b− n− 1
b− n η
n
n
W 6n1 =
1
2
ηnnc
∗
1
W 6n2 =
1
2
ηnnc
∗
2
where
∗ =
1
2
(1 + 2)
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then, we get
ηnn =
2(b− n)n
b+ (1 + 2)(2n− b)
Therefore,
W 6n1 =
(b− n)n
b+ (1 + 2)(2n− b)
21R
b
W 6n2 =
(b− n)n
b+ (1 + 2)(2n− b)
22R
b
In order to find out the best location for the two stores based on the Nash equilibrium, we need
to compare their payoff under case 1 (n1 = n < n2), case 2 (n1 < n2 = n) and special case
(n1 = n = n2). As we have mentioned before, a Nash equilibrium problem is to make both of
the two seller want to stay at their location.
Under case 1,we want to know if the second seller is willing to stay. From the above analysis,
we know that W 1n2 is increasing as n2 decreased, which indicates that n2 should get as close as
possible to n. Since the location are integers, then the maximum W 1n2 happens when n2 = n+1.
Hence we want to compare the actual payoff of the second seller when n1 = n, n2 = n+ 1 and
n1 = n2 = n. By substitution and calculation, one can easily show that W
6
n2 > W
1
n2(n2 = n+1),
which indicates that the second seller would like to move from n2 = n + 1 to n2 = n. This
result force the case 1 to be the special case. However, this special case is actually not a
Nash equilibrium result. Because if the two seller share the same store location, then any one
of them can slightly reduce their price to gain all the trading opportunity with the buyer.
Under case 2, we want to know if the first seller is still want to keep the original location.
As we have discussed before, W 2n1 increased as n1 increased, which means that the maximum
W 2n1 happens when n1 = n − 1. Then compare the actual payoff of the first seller when n1 =
n−1, n2 = n and n1 = n2 = n. Through calculation, one can show that W 2n1(n1 = n−1) > W 6n1 ,
which indicates that the first seller would like to stay at n1 = n− 1. As for the second seller,
if he move forward to n2 = n+ 1, then the profit of the first seller would decrease, and so that
the first guy would move forward to n1 = n, which is actually stay in the same case. If the
second seller want to move backward to n2 = n − 1, then this situation changes into special
case, which is not a Nash problem. Hence, the second seller would also stay at the original
22
setting.
From what we discussed above, we can conclude that the best store location for both of the
two sellers are actually n1 = n− 1 and n2 = n, where n is the starting point of the buyer.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
We discussed a 2-dimensional modification gambler’s ruin scenario, which has some common
performances as the excited regular nearest-neighbor random walk on Z,except being localized
to the two certain point. In the whole Markov chain, the states 0 and b are recurrent states (with
the transition probability equal to 1) and other states are transient states(with the transition
probability smaller than 1). General speaking, the deformation of transition kernel at two
different point can be described as two sellers that providing an instantaneously increased
probability(smaller than 16) in the forward direction when the buyer visits the stores. In this
game, the goal of the buyer is to maximize his expected earning which can be expressed in
terms of a difference between the revenue and the cost. The cost of the buyer is determined by
the price of a cookie, which has been negotiated between the buyer and the sellers. Through
this paper, we discussed a special situation, a fair moving probability for the buyer when he face
the parts without modification. Based on the analysis, the equilibrium price and the stores’
location are two independent variables. Since the starting point of the buyer can be anywhere
between 0 and b, the sellers need to choose the stores’ location to maximize their expected
benefit. For conclusion, we include all the reasonable relationship between the starting point
and the stores’ location, which turns out that the nash equilibrium store location for the two
sellers are n1 = n − 1 and n2 = n, where n is the starting point of the buyer. However, since
the result is just established on the certain case that p = q = 12 and 1, 2 <
1
6 , this assumption
may not be true for all the situations. In fact, we do analysis the different situations, and some
results indicates that the equilibrium price is somehow depending on the store’s location. The
further results need an even deeper analysis.
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